Diplomaxy zine -- Chapter Three

From: Eric_S_Klien@cup.portal.com

Date: Thu, 28 Sep 1989 00:01:13 +0000

Issue #101 of ELECTRONIC PROTOCOL:

Chapter One contains:

D-DAY, NAVARONE, BLITZKRIEG, OPERATION OVERLORD, GETTYSBURG, and HMS HOOD

And is published by Daybell@aludra.usc.edu/Donald Daybell

Chapter Two contains:

DRAGONSLAYER, DOUGHBOY, BISMARK, COLD WAR, JACAL, and TRENCHFOOT

And is published by Tedward@cs.cornell.edu/Ted Fischer

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Chapter Three
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Spring '03 of the game TANNENBURG (BNC number 1989HZ)
(GM is ebrosius@lucy.wellesley.edu/Eric Brosius)

Due next Sunday

Autumn and Winter '01 of the gunboat game VERDUN (MNC number 1989AZrb32)
(GM is sccs6069@iruccibm.bitnet/Michael O'Regan)

Due next Sunday

Summer '14 of the 1914 variant ENTENTE (MNC number not known)
(GM is matt@oddjob.uchicago.edu/Matt Crawford)

Nothing happened.  (Surprise!)

Spring '01 of the Blind variant Mulhouse (MNC number not known)
(GM is barry@freezer.it.udel.edu/Barry T. Fausnaugh)

My outgoing connection to Barry broke so he hasn't received
my messages saying to say results to me.  I left a message
on his answering machine so this problem will be resolved by
next issue.  (And this is not my only e-mail problem, aargh!)

Spring '01 of the game DAWN PATROL (BNC number not known)
(GM is sinhaa@mcmaster.ca/Anand Sinha)

Due date Oct 1st.

Spring '01 of the game RATATOSK (BNC number not known)
(GM is jall@diku.dk/Mogens Jallberg)

Due Sept 28th

Spring '01 of the game BUSHIDO (BNC number not knwn)
(GM is ronin@cory.berkeley.edu/Sam Parazette)

Still checking out e-mail connections between players at this stage.

GM comments:

Wow, that was hard to report game results!

If anyone would like to GM the remaining turns of a twenty player
Diplomacy game, let me know.  The game is now down to 7 players and
you would start GMing September 29th.

I am continuing to start games at a faster and faster pace.  In my
two zines combined, I am now runing 23 games with 20 guest GMs.  I
have over 130 players combined in these zines.  Obviously, it is
becoming harder and harder to keep track of all the games and make
sure that they are being run smoothly.  If anyone would like to fill
some bureaucratic positions in this zine, let me know.  I am starting
to reach my limits.  I also need more GMs, my continuous starting of
games is draining my supply.  (Particulary for variants and for my
postal zine.)

Taken from Hoosier Archives #50:

DIPLOMACY - THE CHURCHILL OPENING
                            By Rod Walker

This article owes its genesis to two sources, which I would like to
acknowledge.  First, Edi Birsan, whose brilliant essay 'The Lepanto
Opening' got me thinking along lines of classic or specific openings.
Second, Phil Castora, playing England in 1971DN (SerenDip) who
observed to me that if he ordered, in Spring 1901, "England makes the
standard opening", the order would be unambiguous.  More on the
latter in a moment.  Anyway, my thanks to Edi and Phil for their
help, unintentioned as it was.  The similarity of Diplomacy and chess
has been noted in many places.  One of my own articles in Strategy
and Tactics is entitled "P-K4", and is an article on openings.  Much
of what I say in this article, in fact, I have said in "P-K4", in my
article on England in "The Diplomacy Cookbook" series in the
forthcoming Tactics and Variants, and elsewhere.  The concept of the
opening is very important in Diplomacy.  It is especially important
to novices, who tend to make ineffective and even dangerous openings.
There are in Diplomacy plenty of equivalents to P-KB4.

Phil Castora's remark about England's 'standard opening' was clear in
the right context.  Phil was well-known in the extremely small
Diplomacy world of 1964-5 and played extensively in the Los Angeles
Science Fiction Society, one of the groups which learned the game
directly from Allan Calhamer himself.  In those days, England's
standard and almost inevitable opening was F Edi-Nws, F Lon-Nts, A
Lvp-Yor.  That is England's P-K4, without a doubt.  It is mildy
aggressive, but at the same time (as we will see) partly defensive.
In the years between 1966 and 1971, during which Phil was not active
in postal Diplomacy, a variant opening was developed.  It is
England's P-Q4, a flashier, more aggressive, and less defensive
opening.  It changes only one of the older standard moves - namely,
it uses A Lvp-Edi.

I call this the Churchill Opening.  It recalls the last days of the
"Phony War" phase of WW II, when England assembled an army in
Scotland and prepared for a descent upon Norway as a means of
flanking Germany (only to find that Germany was descending on Norway
as a means of flanking England).  It recalls, further, Churchill's
plan for opening a Second Front by a similar attack on Norway, rather
than France, in 1943.

At first glance, the move to Edinburgh rather than Yorkshire would
seem to change very little.  Either position is useful for a convoy
to Norway in the Fall of 1901 (although in the context of Diplomacy,
such a convoy turns out to be anti-Russian, not anti-German).
Furthermore, the A Yor has one advantage A Edi doesn't.  It the event
of the French move F Bre-Ech, A Yor can defend London while England
can still support himself into Norway (in the event a Russian move A
Mos-StP makes this necessary).  From Edi, the defense of London
requires using F Nts; F Nts-Lon or A Edi-Lon, F Nth CA Edi-Lon; so
that a supported attack on Norway becomes impossible.  That is the
weakness of the Churchill Opening.

What are its strengths?  The strength lies in aggressive flexibility.
In order to asses this, it is necessary to note what England could do
with F Nws, F Nts, and A Lvp first.  There are several options: (a)
convoy an Army to Norway and support it in; (b) support a fleet into
Norway; (c) attack Norway and send a fleet to Barents; (d) attack
Norway with a fleet and use the other fleet (with or without the
Army) to meddle in continental affairs.  This leaves out the
defensive options, already discussed.  With A Edi, England can do all
these things as well.  The secret lies with the fact that the army
can be convoyed by either fleet.  This adds two new offensive
options: (e) attack Norway with the army and still have F Nts free to
meddle in continental affairs; (f) attack Norway with the army and
move a fleet into Skaggerak.  This latter move is based on an English
strategy to attack Russia via Sweden first, rather than through St.
Petersburg.  These two new options give England greater flexibility,
not only in movement but also in negotiation - a decided asset in a
nation whose offensive possiblities are limited and must be created
by combination with other powers.

Finally, what about that weakness?  There is one circumstance in
which it becomes a real problem.  If France orders F Bre-Ech, England
can still defend London and put a unit in Norway, thus obtaining the
build she will need to hold off the French.  If Russia orders A Mos-
StP, England can still take Norway with support and get a build.

The danger lies in games where France orders F Ber-Ech and Russia
orders A Mos-StP.  The question is - how often is this likely to
happen?  The answer is - not very.  For France, F Bre-Ech involves
giving up all claim or failure to secure both Iberian centers in
1901.  Very occasionally, France will choose to be really aggressive
on the question of Belgium, moving F Bre-Ech, A Par-Pic, and even A
Mar-Bur (thus giving up all hope for Iberia).  Such a move is wholly
unwise - first because it antagonises England unnecessarily; second
because it sacrifices a sure gain of 2 for a merely probably gain of
1; third because it puts all of France's eggs in one basket before he
knows which basket really needs his attention.

For Russia, A Mos-StP involves Russia's northern strategy, which
promises slim pickings, at best, and foregoing the (usually) more
profitable southern strategy.  There are circumstances in which such
moves become attractive, and even necessary.  They are both, however,
rare openings.  The game in which they are used is very seldom seen.
The dual move suggests a Franco-Russian alliance, but this is more
reasonably directed against Germany.  A fear of Anglo-German alliance
could provoke this sort of thing, however.  Another alliance which
provokes this move is France-German-Russia which has its only object
the elimination of Allan Calhamer's Wicked Witch of the North -
England.

In the final analysis, then, England is taking a bit of a risk with
the Churchill Opening.  However, if he has been astute and persuasive
in his Diplomacy, he should have nothing to fear.  Even should France
and Russia move against him, he still has not lost.  He must now
simply cope with a problem which he risked when he selected this
opening - and a problem which would be of only slightly smaller
magnitude had he been more defensive, anyway.

I am enjoying moderating this zine, keep that mail coming!

Eric Klien