Diplomacy Zine -- EP #193 Chapter Seven

From: Eric_S_Klien@cup.portal.com

Date: Tue, 14 Aug 1990 03:35:46 +0000

Issue #193 of ELECTRONIC PROTOCOL:

************************************************************************
Robbie woke up.  And screamed.  It was an animal sound, but he didn't
care.  The brain cart, evidently excited by the sound, wheeled around
even faster, driving itself against the concrete walls of the enclosure
again and again and again --

They cut away his scream, of course.  They cut away everything they
couldn't use.  They dissected him neatly, retaining only the brain-box,
the eye, and a fernlike structure of nerves.  The flesh they threw to
the jungle.  And in the climate-controlled computer laboratory where
nothing could rot, they replaced his blood with a colorless flurocarbon
analog.  They inserted deep electrodes.  When the visual cortex had been
sufficiently mapped, they snipped off the eye and fed it to the birds.
And Robbie sank deeper into the machine.  Without the eye there was no
up, no down, no day, no night.  His consciousness was one with the
machine, filled will glowing digital phantoms.  He didn't understand the
tasks that were demanded of him, didn't comprehend the ghostly display
of winking digits that were now his only perceptual reality.  But the
machine could give pleasure and the machine could give pain, and in
time he would learn.

And on the third day he stopped imagining that he was breathing, forgot
that he had ever breathed at all.
************************************************************************

Chapter One contains:

BLITZKRIEG, GETTYSBURG, RED STORM RISING, and PASSCHENDAELE

And is published by daybell@aludra.usc.edu/Donald Daybell

Chapter Two contains:

DRAGONSLAYER, JACAL, MANHATTAN, VERSAILLES, DRESDEN, and KHAN

And is published by tedward@cs.cornell.edu/Ted Fischer

Chapter Three contains:

MULHOUSE, DAWN PATROL, SNIKKEL-2, BERLIN, SNIKKEL-1, EL ALAMEIN,
SQUALANE, UNGAWE, CAPTAIN CAVEMAN

And is published by cwekx@htikub5.bitnet/Constantijn Wekx

Chapter Four contains:

NICKEL, OZARK, DEADLY DAGGERS, YORKTOWN, MONTREUIL-SUR-MER

Chapter Five contains:

ARCHANGEL, BORDEL, ERIS, MASADA, and YALTA

And is published by bmers58!dgibbs@bnrgate/David Gibbs

Chapter Six contains:

TOKUGAWA, BERLIN WALL, HIROSHIMA, GENGHIS KHAN, SEA LION, VIOLENT
PEACE

And is published by sinhaa@mcmaster.ca/Anand Sinha

-----------
Chapter Seven
-----------

No games this issue.

Publisher comments:

Quote is from p. 153 and 154 of the book Antibodies by David J. Skal.

The following articles were given to me by m.i.nelson@gdr.bath.ac.uk/
Mark Nelson:

EVALUATING INTENTIONS
 By Francois Cuerrier

(( Reprinted from Passchendaele #52, March 1988))

Who to trust, who to believe -- the eternal question.  Remember that
this is a game with a very odd paradox: in order to win, you must
secure the help of at least one or two other players.  Yet your
opponents are in it to win, as well, and therefore have no good
reason to help you.  If you take the game too seriously, you'll soon
be certified as paranoid: any offer of assistance is just too good to
be true; everybody else is out to get you.

Sorting out your friends of the moment from your enemies is probably
the single most important decision you'll have to make in the context
of any game. Take your enemy for a friend and he will likely see to
it that you have no opportunity to repeat tge mistake again.
Furthermore, the decision is only as good as the last season; you
need to continually re--assess your relationships in light of new
circumstances and changing goals.  You're just like the physician who
must monitor the cardiac condition of a very ill patient without the
aid of his stethoscope.  Fail and you'll be nailed by the malpractice
suit.  Again, not a game to be taken too seriously, or it will drive
you to drink.

Just how are you supposed to determine who is sincere?  No one is
omniscent, yet the player closest to that will always be one step
ahead. There are some factors to analyse, some subtle signs to look
out for; learn how and become a master of the game.

Feasability.  Is the proposal ludicrous?  Does it make sense for a
player to do as promised? Austria can commit herself to helping
Germany defend Munich against the French, which is very nice indeed
but quite open to question when within the context of a combined
attack by Italy and Russia.

Credibility.  Examine your opponent's past history.  Does he keep his
promises?  Has he lied before, and more relevant yet, were his lies
necessary.  Frivolous players are the hardest sort to guard against
because of their sheer unrealibity, and alliances with them are also
amongst the least profitable because valuable resources must be tied
down  to guard tghe unsure border.

Coherence.  Read the letters many times oveer for contradictions.
Should you really put faith in a letter from Italy promising to
attack Austria "at the earlist opportunity", which then proceeds to
dump all over Russia?  You must wonder as Turkey if Italy is really
interested in war against Austria when he is doing his level best to
induce you to into attacking his natural ally; or if his real aim is
not to get you embroiled with your northern giant as he and Austria
gleefully plunge in the knife.

Be sure to store all letters, and compare them with recent
correspondence for consistency.  Often players will outsmart
themselves, lose track of their own lies, or just plain forget what
they told you.  As a result, they may come up with contradictory or
mutually exclusive proposals from letter to letter.  If Russia in
Spring 1901 starts out by proposingto move to Bla in "self-defence",
promising a Fall withdrawel, and then in Fall 190 proposes instead to
keep moving eastward to "help out" in the Mediterranean in 1902, then
you really ought as Turkey to start wondering just what his first
letter really meant.

Consistency.  How does your opponent's correspondence fit in with
the general board situation and information from other (reliable)
sources? Does it make sense for Russia to suggest a joint
Scandinavian venture against England after building F(StPsc)?
As Turkey in 1901, how much value can you place on Italian
assurance od co--operation against Austria after hearing from
France that he just can't seem to reason with the upstart
Mediterranean power, and expects trouble in that area as early as
1901?

Profit Motive.  Perhapes the best way to second-guess an ally or
enemy is, for a minute, to "put yourselves in his/her shoes", to empathize.
What he suggests must be in his own general best interest, or else he's
either completely incompetnt or not entirely shooting straight with
you.  Either way, he won't make a reliable ally.  Ask yourself what's
in it for him.  A proposal that is too good to be true generally
is.

Alternatives.  Of course you should believe the poor fellow if he has
no choice but to do what he says.  Can you really gert suspicious of
the guy if he states that he will try to occupy the only center
likely to kepp him in the game?  As a general rule of thumb, you can
expect a player to follow the strategy most profitable to his
interests.  You should be careful, for example, not to become his
easiest target of expansion.  Nor should you expect him to stab an ally
that is essential to his progress or survival.

Mind you, allowances must always be made for less--than--competent
players.  Not all will have coherent long-term goals, if they have
any at all; their idea of a good plan is trying to take Trieste next
turn.  You will eventually get to know such persons, and will have to
think in terms of limited goals rather than overall benefits when
trying to second--guess them.

Commitment.  Always ask a lot of questions.  You'll still get an
answer of sorts as soon as the recipient starts ignoring or evading
the questions...

When evaluating the merits of a proposal, make sure to make beautiful
plans that involve the other guy two or three seasons (perhapes even
more!) before he has to tip his hand.  More importantly, will you be
hurt seriously if you attack a third party first only to find out
that the "alliance" was not worth the paper it was written on?
emember that the best diplomatic position is always squarely on top
of the fence.

Deterence.  Often the best way to keep opponents honest is to make
them fear your retaliation, or to make any possible attack as
difficult and as sterile as possible.  With England and Germany  at
ten centres each, will Germany dare break an agreement and build a
second fleet when England has allthe navel strength?  It may be
tempting for an ally to move adjacent to your undefended border until
he is made aware that you will retreat a dislodged unit off the board
so thart a build can be made smack on the border ("fast retreat
home").

Security.  This can actually take three forms: your border is heavily
defended; your border is governed by a demilitarized zone agreement,
though these have to be examined closely, particularly when they
involve home centres; the pre-arranged stand-off that keeps everyone
honest.

Again, beware of loopholes -- consider:

RUSSIA F(Rum)-Bla, A(Sev)-Arm.
TURKEY F(Bla)-Rum, A(Arm)-Sev.

It is easy for Turkey to go with A(Arm)SF(Bla)-Sev for an easy build.

The harder it is for your ally to stab, the more likely that he will
stick to his part of any bargain.  In effect, you can readhis attack
plans one game--year ahead of time.  It is even better if you managr
to get more units on the border than he had, though getting him to
agree to unfavourable odds will be another matter entirely.  If he
does, then please do not hesitate to stab him at the earliest
opportunity -- he deserves it.

Dependancy.  An ally will not stab you for as long as you have not
outlived your usefulness.  Conversely, an ally will not risk your
wrath is his survival depends on your good will.  The importance of
this factor is magnified in puppethood agreements, stalemate line
positions, and corner power-central power arrangements.

Basically, the secret lies perhapes in respecting your opponents, in
assuming that they will govern themselves at least as rationally and
intelligently as you would.  Hardly can this always be the case,
particualarly in games with large numbers of novices or personality
clashes.  Nevertheless, observance of the above ten guidelines will
soon reveal who is reliable and who is not.  Steer clear of
uncontrollable allies -- they rarely bring you anything but grief.

CONFESSIONS OF A DIPLOMACY ADDICT

((Reprinted from Victorianna34, July 1990, and
written by Alex Smirnov))

My name is XXXXX. It started out harmlessly enough.  I started with
roleplaying.  No real harm, just a little fun.  All my friends were
doing it.  Pretty soon I needed something harder.  I began to
experiment with Wargaming. It had an odd effect on me.  I started to
have hallucinations that I was another Rommel or Montgomery.  I was
taking Wargaming about twice a week.

Then one summer a friend told me that he was doing Diplomacy.  I was
shocked. I thought that I knew my friend.  I couldn't imagine him
sitting with his eyes glued to a diplomacy board for hours, or him
conferring with another person in a dark corner of a room plotting
the destruction of a country.

My first experience with Diplomacy came at a party.  I kept wondering
why people went in and out of a back room of the house.  People had
strange smiles on their faces. There would be oblique references ---
'So and so is talking to so and so`. Out of curiosity I went into the
back room.  To my amazement, there were seven people sitting around a
Diplomacy board, including my friend.  They invited me to stay.  I
was a bit hesitant at first, but figuring that watching a game
couldn't hurt, I stayed.  I became engrossed in the game.  When a
player had to go, I took his place without hesitation.  I suppose
that was the beginning of my addiction.

It's been three years now and I expanded to regular games between
friends, hobbymeets, tournaments and postal diplomacy.  Much of my
time and money is spent on Diplomcy.  Going cold Turkey without
Diplomacy makes me breakout in a sweat.  I suppose I'll be a
Diplomacy addict for the rest of my life..

Predicting the End
Howard Mahler

((Reprinted from Impassable #18, 17--3--73))

I'm sure that most of you will have wondered at one time or another
when a particular game of diplomacy would end.  This article will try
to give you the means to make an educated guess.  Aside from any
possible 'practical value' I think it's fun to make such predictions.
For example, as a preview, I predict that 1972AZ (where I'm France)
will be over by Winter 1907.  If you want to know why, read on and
try to bear with a minimum of mathematics.

First for those of you who live in the real world, six years in
Diplomacy time equals about one year real time (using Impassable's
deadline system). The basic idea of my method is to measure the
'imbalence of power.'  We will end up with one number, which
hopefully will tell us how far along the game is.

1. Find the average number of supply centres held by taking
the total (usually 34, except near the beginning of a game)
and dividing by seven.
2. Get each country's 'deviation from the mean' by subtracting
its supply centre count from the average.
3. Square each country's deviation.
4. Add the results of step #3 for each country.
5. Divide the result of #4 by 7.
6. Take the square root of the result of step #5.

The results of step #6 is the standard deviation (s.d).

The s.d would then in some sense represent the imbalance of the
present position.  At the beginning of a game the s.d is 0.350.  This
also happens to be the s.d of the most balenced position that can
occur, when all the centers are controlled (with one player on four
and the rest on five).

Another quantity of interest in the minimum s.d that can occur when a
game ends.  This minimum value will occur when the distribution is
18, 3, 3, 3, 3, 2, 2.  Then we have a s.d of 5.38.  On the other
hand, the maximum s.d one can have without someone winning is 7.67
and occurs when two players have 17 centres each.

With the results of the last two paragraphs in mind, we introduce a
new parameter M which  is zero at the start of a game and roughly
100% when it is over.  To do this, one defines M to be equal to (s.d
minus 0.35) divided by six.

So M represents roughly the percentage of the game that has elapsed.
For instance, 1972AZ had M=56% at the end of 1904.  Therefore, one
might predict that 1972AZ will be over at about the end of 1907.  On
the other hand, 1972CK has M=5% after two years.  Therefore, one
might expect it would take 40 (!) game years to complete!  I don't
think this will be so...

I'm aware that other factors besides the number of supply centers
enter into how long a game will run, i.e alliance structures,
tactical position, skill of the players involved, etc.  The M number
does not take these factors into account.  Also, the M number doesn't
march like the Roman Legions, straight to its goal of 100%.  It can
stand still  due to a deadlock, or even decrease when people gang up
on the front runner.

However, one can't escape the fact that for someone to win, M has to
be greater than 83% and conversely, M can never be greater than 122%
without someone winning.

To quote Mr. Boyer ((editor of Impassable)) 'Accuracy will be the big
problem.  Human nature is quite unpredictable.' However it will be
hoped that this article will give the means to make an educated
guess.  In any case, I hope that you'll get a laugh or two out of
what the accompanying list has to say about your games.

((Howard then went on to make predictions for all of the
Impassable games.  In what follows before the Boardman
Number is the last year for which Howard had data, then comes
his predicted game-length figure, and finally the actual length:
1905/1970BJ: 9, 23;
1904/1972AZ: 7, 12;
1904/1972BG: 10,15;
1904/1972BW: 12, 25 or more
1903/1972CD: 20,10;
1903/1972CJ: 7, 10;
1903/1972CK: 20, 10;
1903/1972DD: 9, 9;
1902/1972DF: 7, 9.
 These figures were provided by March Berch
when he reprinted this article.))

((Reprinted from Fol Si Fie #27, 1975.))

On The Philosophy of Articles

By Randolph Smyth

Do the articles on good play which are regular features of many
fanzines really improve the general standard of play for the average
Diplomacy player? It may instead be argued that the prevalent
discussion of 'How to win' articles may actually be a negative
experience, particularly for beginners.  A disclaimer may be made
(and noted by the reader) that the strategies outlined are only
possibilities, depending for success on the overall diplomatic
situation.  However the basic philisophy of angling for methods of
winning, beginning with Spring 1901 or before, may contribute to the
overagressive attitude that I have noticed as a common characteristic
of many novices.  They are told, 'Read a few articles: they have good
advice on how the game should be played.'  They are cautioned to take
the general advice with a grain of salt depending on the reputation
of the author; but rarely is the seed of aggression nipped in the
bud.

Of course, the Rulebook itself says: 'Object of the Game: To control
eighteen centers." etc. Yet, perhapes this statement alone is enough
to provide the necessary competitive spirit.  Is it realistic even to
think about 18 before a minimum of, say, 10 have been captured?  Two
stauch allies beginning a game may expect to take 9-10 centers
between them as a basic share of the total, and have more potential
for attacks on friendless neighbours.  Even here, discussion of a
two--way draw is perhapes premature in 1901, unless the players
consider themselves sufficiently superior to their opponents in
experience and ability.  There may, then, be a need for lower--key
articles, emphasizing the merits of doing the best one can from
season to season.  This doesn't mean losing sight of long-term goals,
but to look at every position with an eye to an eventual win is being
optimistic.

Those with plenty of experience may not derive much benefit from
articles not suited to their personal style; if they adapt themselves
to the author's opinions, they may be led astray, however 'right' the
author is. Consider the case of standbys.  The wariness felt by long-
-term allies, and the new hope of established enemies as one enters
the game is not entirely due to the unfamiliarity of the standby with
his new position, or a difference in ability, or a new bias due to
interpersonal conflicts (although all these maybe major factors in
given situations).  The new player will often take his country off in
a direction different from that envisaged by the departed one.  There
will not always be general agreement on whether the change is for
'better' or 'worse' as far as the country's outlook is concerned.
Assuming the players are of equal ability (an impossibility?), it can
only be described as 'different'. One course will probably meet with
more success, but this depends only on the unpredictable details of
the future moves of the other players, and no criticism of either
course can be revealed in advance.

To blindly follow the general advice given in another player's
article is a poor policy, even with the diplomatic climate
favourable, if the resulting position doesn't feel 'right' for you.

The closest parallel that comes to mind is that of a chessplayer
following a 'book' opening which involves hair-raising tactical
exchanges in the middle game.  Unfortunately, the poor guy is far
better at maneuvering patiently and making positional caculations
from locked structures.  He obtains a perfectly sound, if unclear,
position after 15 moves, leaves the 'book', and loses in 5 moves
because he doesn't really feel comfortable proceeding on hisown.

If you like diplomacy, you'll probably affirm that each game has a
character all of its own (otherwise, why play more than one, ever?)
Some situations call for more aggressive attitudes than others if the
potential is to be fully exploited.  We all know the difference
between 'fast' and 'slow' games: a functional difference is that
'fast' ones usually require separate Winter seasons due to rapid
shifts in the balence of power.  Aggressive players usually excel
here --- not aggressive in the sense of being obnoxious and
unrealistic in the demands made on their fellow players, but of
approaching the position in the spirit of the buccaneer rather than
the Pope.  Of course, the Pope will do better in other situations.

Even the best tactical/strategic/diplomatic articles, then, are only
useful as 'how do' guides, once you've decided on your own that the
goal outlined is the one for you.  What factors should enter into the
preliminary all--important choice? Can the most successful players
set out the methods which they have found to work so well for them?
(Are they willing to?) Do they know themselves what influences their
caculations, or is it just a vague feeling? (Or, am I all wet?)

It is just this capability of approaching the induvidual game in its
own way that may make the 'giants' of the hobby what they are,
whether they realize it or not.  An inflexible player may score
several spectacular successes with his 'method' (probably convincing
him of its validity and making him more inflexible than ever), yet
bomb out else where for no apparent reason.  Better players adjust
their thinking in ways more subtle than simple consideration of the
nature of theie opponents, the strength of their present position,
and other 'surface' qualities. Perhapes the major advantage of
'philisophical flexibility' is that article with a wider range of
viewpoints (more total articles/ideas) can be used to a good effect
by a player who can adapt to the thinking of the writers, leaving him
with the maximum possible benefit in any position.  As outlined
above, however, woe to the less flexible player who attempts the same
appraoch!

Many questions, expressed and implied; few answers.  To analyse the
game theories used by better players than oneself is probably
impossible.  One bit of solid advice: if you're not doing well, stick
with your approach (or, change it to see how flexible you are ---but
be prepared for the possible consequences!).  And, like all articles,
don't take this one as gospel -- in common with most, this author is
alas, all too fallible.

THE ODD THEORY

By EDI BIRSAN

((Reprinted from Diplomacy World}
Vol 1, No, 1. Jan-Feb 1974.))

How many times have you heard the old myth that ``Naturally, in any
well--played game, Diplomacy is a seven--way draw''?  The assumptions
here are two fold:

1.  Everyone on the board knows the tactical and strategical side
of the game inside out and; and,

2.  Each player is of the win--only school of thought in which
one must either try for a win or stop all others from
winning.

In your average game, none of the above two assumptions hold true and
certainly the numerous winner--only games and top--board games have
been lacking in draws and the case can be put forth that one of the
two assumptions did not apply there.

But let us suppose that there are seven players who fit the two
critical needs for a well--played game of Diplomacy.  If that game
ends in anything less than a three--way draw, they have violated the
basic assumptions that allowed them to be chosen for the game!

In other words, a  well--played game between seven top--notch win--
only players is a three--way tie at least, and possibly a two--way
tie, and definitely large NOT a seven--way tie as myth would hold up
to light.

The solution to the seven--way draw problem is the  odd theory
touched on in the IDA's handbook article on strategic balence.
Starting at the beggining with seven players, the board is
continually divided into two distinct warring camps along the lines
of an odd breakdown:

A. Round One: 5 countries against 2, leaves 5 for

B. Round Two: 3 countries against 2, leaves 3 for

C. Round Three; 2 countries against 1 or draw on strategic
grounds.

After round one, the elimination of two countries should leave the
remaining five powers with about 6-7 centers each with the powers
with the most borders having the additional one piece advantage. Due
to the perculiar needs for the progression to work, two of the most
popular alternatives for roundone would be:

1. The Witch Hunt: F-G-R-A-I vs E and T;

2. The  Witch Wish: E-T-A-I-G vs Fand R.

There is no hope for the two countries faced with a five power
attacking block.  Trying to suicide against one power would most
likely not work as each of the five powers stands to gain a shot at a
bid for mid--game dominace with a 3 on 2 situation and thus would not
risk blowing open the five--power alliance by greed.

In the second round, the game gets really tense as the division of
the board into a group of three and a group of two gives the smallest
edge to the three--power alliance who will slowly grind down the duo
until there are but the three left.  Once again, it would be foolish
for any of the three to risk accepting the temptation of suicide on
one of his allies for he would be severely hurt by the loss of
diplomatic chance with the remaining situation or Round 3.

When the board comes down to the last three powers on 11--11--12
units , there is a distinct choice here for the game's future.  All
three can agree to a three--way draw on the grounds that for any one
of them to initiate an attack on an another would hand the game to
the third power.  Thus, the game is a strategic and dipomatic
stalemate rather than the more conventional tactical stalemates we
are accustomed to.

Then again, there could be an agreement between two of the players to
divide up the territory of the third and race for the win.  The
counter move to this is dumping your units onto the lap of one of the
attackers and thus swinging the game to a chosen member of your
attackers, if you happen to be the victim.

Or, two players can begin a slow and integrated advance on the third
power in such a way as to gradually reduce his units and to prevent a
suicide by the intermixing of units on the front.  Carefully done,
this could be arranged to yield in a small percentage of cases a 17--
17 draw.

So for those of you who find yourselves locked into the same old
large n-way draws, you might try employing the odd theory  to bring
about a trend away from the seven and six way draw feasts that plague
many over--the--board areas in the country.  With players being
eliminated more often, maybe  the temptation to play for survival in
a puppet or strong second class may take hold in your group and lead
you down to further new road of victories and close defeats, but most
of all, a change of pace in play.

A MYTH DEFENDED
 BY LEW PULSIPHER

((reprinted from Diplomacy World Vol.1, No.5 ---Sept--Oct 1974.))

I thought of titling this ``The Even Theory'' as a counter to Edi
Birsan's Odd Theory printed (in Diplomacy World #1).  Edi's theory is
one way of playing, but it is not necessarily the way perfect players
would play, and he has offered no definitions, proof, or examples,
only assertions, to show why he believes a perfectly played Diplomacy
game will be a 3-player draw.  I believe that I can satisfactorily
show that a 3-player draw is not the necessary outcome of a perfectly
played game, though a 2- or 3-way draw is. I think this will also
show that the  theoretical outcome of the standard Diplomacy game is
a 7- or 6-player draw.

Why is a common 3-player draw not likely to break down among  balence
of power players to another result?  Simply, no single player can
chance attacking another, for fear that the third, unengaged player
will take advantage of both of the others and win.  What we really
have here are three seperate interest groups as well as three
players; each player is one interest group. The game is drawn when
the three player-interest groups resolve themselves into one interest
group --each player must act in such a manner that both of the others
remain viable powers, or else he may fall and another may win.

Unwillingly, the three must work together for the same end as they
work for themselves; this is forced on them by the nature of the
game.  A resolution down to a single interest group embracing all
surviving players is the outcome of any Diplomacy game which does not
involve a stalemate line defense. (I do not include concessions, by
which a player outside the winning interest  group may survive
because the game is not played out; the same is true for a rulebook
win -- the game is not played out, so the losers survive even though
they are not part of the winning interest group. Two interest groups
remain when one is defending a stalemate line against the other in a
drawn game.

Edi's mistake is in assuming that each player automatically
represents a seperate interest group.  As we have seen above and will
see later, more than one one player may be part of a single interest
group. A good example of such a situation is the recently completed
demo game.  Turkey, Italy and Austria were part of a single interest
group which had to remain together in order to withstand the other
two players, who were each an interest group but were working
together to take advantage of the disorganization of the third
interest group on the board.  Turkey chose to perpetuate this
disorganization by stabbing his allies.  He hoped to be able to
eliminate them anbd set himself up as a one--player interest group in
place of the three--player interest group.  This was a bad play, as
we saw.

In a perfectly--played game, the southeastern interest group would
have held the stalemate line and a five--player draw would have
resulted ---three ways, five players.  Given especially good play by
Italy, Austria and Turkey, they might have even held on to a draw
without a stalemate line, for Germany and France could not trust each
other fully.  Play of this caliber is not to be expected even in a
demonstration game, however.  Ineffect, Italy, Austria and Turkey had
to act as a single player in order to avoid losing, and such
cooperation is difficult to establish.

If you look at drawn games which do not involve stalemate lines, you
will find that they are virtually always draws of three interest
groups, resolving into one when the game ends, no matter how many
players are involved.  Stalemate lines draws tend to be of two
interest groups.  For example, a 17--17 draw (which is a stalemate
line in most cases) can be between two one--player interest groups,
or between a one--player and a two--player interest group, or various
other combinations.  This combination into interest groups explains
why a perfectly played Diplomacy game ought to be a seven--player
draw: no player will be willing to break up his interest group,
because the chances will be too great that another interest group,
which is playing perfectly, will move in and destroy his interest
group and his own country.

This interest group concept applies throughout the game.  The eastern
and western spheres (Austria-Russia-Turkey, England-France-Germany,
Italy in both or perhapes neither) are each an interest group at the
beginning of the game.  Their interest is in resolving their conflict
before the other interest group can.  If they do so, one or moe of
their number will win the game.  (Of course, a  win by a multi--
member interest group is actually a draw unless it is further
resolved within the group ---unlikely in a perfectly played game.) In
a perfectly played game it is unlikely that one interest group will
triumph.  Rather, players will perceive that they must work together
or else the other sphere--interest group will gain the upper hand.

One can see that no player can begin a conflict in his sphere unless
he can be sure that the conflict will be resolved in time to set up a
defense against a threat from the other sphere.  And ignoring for the
moment the existance of stalemate lines of less than 17 units, this
means that no player can begin a conflict in his sphere--interest
group because he cannot be sure that the other sphere--interest
group will not immediately begin an advance that will destroy his own
interest group before its conflict can be resolved.  In this manner,
a seven--player draw would be the most likely outcome.  Given the
availability of stalemate lines of 14 or so units, a 6--player draw
may be more likely than a 7--player draw. I am inclined to think that
a 7--player, 3--way draw (with Italy being the third interest group)
is the theoretical outcome.

Perhaps part of my disagreement with Edi stems from our definitions
of a perfect player.  A perfect player is one who maximizes his
minimum gain --- this is the definition used in game theory. This
means that a perfect player will always strive to avoid losing.  If
he has a choice between a win and six losses on the one hand, and
seven 7--player draws on the other, he will take the latter because
he has a minimum gain of a seven--player draw (1/7 of a win), while
in the former he has a minimum of a loss. (Naturally I refer to
balence of power players --- any draw is preferable to any place,
even second with 16 units.)  If this perfect player is playing
against imperfect players, he will do better than his minimum gain:
some of his opponents will err, and fewer will participate in the
draw.  The perfect player (again referring to game theory) assumes
perfect play on the part of his opponents; then by maximizing his
minimum gain, he is assured of that minimum gain but can expect
better if his opponents play less than perfectly --- this is derrived
from the game theory definition of the best games strategy.

I think Edi would say that a perfect player, offered the above
choice, would take the win and six losses.  This means that he would
take more chances: 1/7 of the time he would succeed, 6/7 of the time
he would fail (given perfect opposition), and as a perfect player he
would not take the chances that gave him a greater than 6/7 risk of
losing.  I think that against perfect players this player would never
find an opportunity to take such a risk, and he would have to accept
a draw just as every other perfect player would.

But against imperfect players, this strategy would result in more
outright wins and more losses than would the  draw strategy.  This
difference is reflected partially in our play.  My ratio of draws to
outright wins is much higher than Edi's, while my ratio of losees to
nonlosses is much lower.  I have been completely eliminated only one,
while Edi is eliminated relatively more often -- an inevitable
consequence of taking more chances.  Given Edi's type of player,
someone in an interest group may take a chance. By breaking up his
interest group, he may actually allow himself to come out on top if
another interest group is broken at the same time.  But he may also
be committing suicide.

The advice given in Edi's article is not good--- fair more often than
not, you would find that you fail because you're not a perfect player
yourself.  It is probably wiser to maintain the integrity of your own
interest group and wait for someone from the other (or another)
interest group to make an error first.  This  error of breaking up a
sphere--interest group is  common in postal Diplomacy, where one can
be certain that play will be less than perfect even in demonstartion
games, that the average player can often work to form an interest
group of two players within his sphere by eliminating one of the
sphere members, without much fear that the other interest group will
stick together.  In those cases where one interest group does remain
together at game start, we see that it quickly crushes the other,
broken interest group.  The only thing that can save a broken
interest group is imperfect play in the other interest group.

In defending the mytho of the 7--player draw I have unintentionally
presented an  even theory.  Most games will not follow this pattern
of eastern vs western interest groups as most games are not well
played (and that is an understatement).  The only 7--player draw that
I ever played (FTF) followed this pattern, even though it was far
from perfectly played (which maybe why Italy was intact in the
eastern sphere while Turkey was down to one unit in Tunis holding the
line for the west).

(I am using definitions from zero--sum game theory.  Diplomacy is a
zero--sum game, as one player's loss is directly another's gain.
These ideas don't necessarily apply to non--zero--sum multi--player
games.)

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